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Abstract 
This paper measures that the Bank of Japan adopted the “too big 
to fail” doctrine against the panic of 1927. The results at this paper 
imply that supported banks had higher closure risk or occupied key 
positions in the local loan-markets. And this paper finds that the 
Bank of Japan bailed out solvent banks if they had political 
importance. 
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Sudden crises of systemic illiquidity may trigger panics (Diamond and Dybvig 1983; 
Carlson 2005). In a normally functioning interbank market, the surplus liquidity in 
some banks can be transferred to illiquid banks. On the other hand, the panic may 
result in even solvent banks becoming illiquid since they cannot borrow from other 
banks. The lender of last resort (hereafter the LLR) has a role of emergency lending 
to illiquid banks (Bagehot 1873; Miron 1986; Bordo 1990). Since bank managers can 
take additional risks in such a rescue under skewed incentives, the LLR assistance 
is expected to refuse the moral hazard problem (Rochet and Tirole 1996; Goodhart 
and Huang 2005). Insolvent banks are more likely to fail due to market discipline 
during the panic (Gorton 1985; Calomiris and Mason 2003a). If the LLR can target 
relatively solvent banks, the costs of a partial bailout could be much less than that 
of a system-wide bailout (Calomiris and Mason 2003b). However, the LLR may 
prevent insolvent banks from failing as the optimal choice if the authority regards 
that they occupy key positions in the banking system or if the number of bank 
failures is large (Freixas, et al. 2002; Acharya and Yorulmazer 2007). This is the 
“too big to fail” doctrine.1 
During the first half of the 1920s, the Bank of Japan had provided liquidity 
support for large banks with transaction relationships with itself (Ishii 1980; 
Okazaki 2006a).2 Such liquidity support caused the moral hazard problems and 
resulted in the panic of 1927 (Fukai 1941; Takahashi and Morigaki 1993; Teranishi 
1999). Against the panic of 1927, the Bank of Japan avoided this bailout policy, and 
the screening committee was organized to select which banks to rescue (Takahashi 
and Morigaki 1993). However, Ehiro (2000) finds that some closed banks were 
provided the special loans even though they were insolvent. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore whether the Bank of Japan provided the 
special loans for insolvent banks against the panic of 1927. This paper uses the 
basic idea of the propensity scoring approach.3 The analysis is conducted on two 
levels. The first examines causes of bank closure during the panic period to 
estimate closure risk. This paper uses a cross-sectional data set consisting of 
observations on 1364 ordinary banks in 1926. 30 ordinary banks closed during the 
panic period 15 March from 25 April. The logit model regression provides the 
                                                  
1 For example, Gup (2005) collects historical or cross-country comparisons. 
2 Kasuya (2001) surveys related literature. 
3 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) provide the idea of the propensity scoring approach. 
 4
estimated propensity to close. The second level of analysis is the tobit model 
regressions, which test whether both bank importance and the estimated propensity 
affected provision of the special loans. 
The contribution of this paper is to measure the “too big to fail” doctrine in 
terms both of bank closure risk and of bank importance. Yabushita and Inoue (1993) 
find that financial indices, such as capital ratio (paid-in capital / total assets) or 
ROE (return on equity), can explain bank closure in 1927. Market discipline may 
have worked well. This paper retests causes of bank closure during the panic period 
and regards the estimated propensity to close as the measure of “to fail.” This paper 
also uses both bank-level information on the market share and prefecture-level 
information on votes of the election of 1928 regarding these two indices as the 
measure of bank importance, “too big.” Freixas, et al. (2002) interpret the “too big to 
fail” as designed to rescue banks which occupy key positions in the banking system 
rather than banks simply with large size. Brown and Dinç (2005) explore regulatory 
interventions in emerging markets in the 1990s and point out that bank failures are 
due to the incentives of politicians.  
The results at this paper imply that the Bank of Japan bailed out banks with 
higher closure risk. These insolvent banks occupied key positions in the local 
loan-markets. The bank of Japan may have rescued borrowers of them rather than 
depositors. And the bailout policy may have reflected political concerns to some 
extent. Supported banks were “too big to fail.” 
The first section below summarizes historical background. Then Section 2 
presents information on methodology and data used in this paper. Empirical results 
are presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses implications of this work. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
1. Historical Background 
1.1 Depression in the 1920s 
As shown in Table 1, real gross value-added of the Japan’s banking sector 
decreased during the period from 1924 to 1928 while real GNP was increasing. The 
banking sector in the 1920s faced serious depression due to the bad-loan problems. 
The value of bad loans which was outstanding in the end of 1926 reached 201 in 
millions yen (54.1% of gross value-added of the banking sector).4 Three factors 
                                                  
4 Using commerce-services deflator estimated by Ohkawa, et al. (1974, Table 31). 
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caused a large amount of bad loans. First, the Great Earthquake of 1923 damaged 
banks in the urban areas. Second, connected lending caused in poor performance of 
loan portfolios (Kato 1957; Okazaki, et al. 2005). The third factor is the moral 
hazard due to emergency lending by the Bank of Japan (Teranishi 1989; Takahashi 
and Morigaki 1993). 
Table 2 shows the annual data of the number of ordinary banks in the first 
column and the number of the average size of bank capital in the second column. 
During the 1920s, the number of banks decreased sharply, and the average size was 
increasing. Decreasing of the number of banks was caused by bank closure due to 
bank runs or by bank consolidation which the government promoted. 
The prudential policy was incomplete before the Bank Law of 1928.5 The 
deposit insurance system had no legal foundation until GHQ reforms during the 
second half of the 1940s (Ehiro 2000; Asai 2000). Deposit rate regulation did not 
work well (Teranishi 1991). And entry regulation was less strict. The Bank Law has 
two main reforms. The first is that the minimum capital requirement was increased 
substantially. The government regarded that financial difficulties in small-sized 
banks had caused the inefficiency of the banking system during the 1920s (Asai 
2000). Second, bank directors were prohibited to engage in other business. Director 
interlocking between banks and firms resulted in most banks becoming insolvent 
(Kato 1957; Okazaki, et al. 2005). The prohibition of bank director interlocking 
aimed to prevent connected lending from causing poor performance of bank 
portfolios. 
 
1.2 The Panic of 1927 
Two waves of bank runs occurred in the spring of 1927. On 14 March, the 
Finance Minister, Kataoka Naoharu, made an ill-advised remark during the debate 
on the bad-loan problem. On the following day, newspapers printed his remark. The 
news triggered the first wave of bank runs. 
The second impact was more serious. While leakage of poor performance of loan 
portfolios triggered the first wave, liquidity concerns triggered the second panic 
(Korenaga, et al. 2001). The Bank of Taiwan, which aimed to develop the Taiwanese 
economy, had also faced to the bad-loans problem due to connected lending. The 
main customer went bankrupt. The interbank markets became confused since most 
                                                  
5 Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) explain the history of the modern financial system in Japan. 
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of call loans to the Bank of Taiwan were recovered suddenly. The Ministry of 
Finance permitted closure of the Bank of Taiwan on 18 April.6 This triggered the 
second wave of bank runs. Even big five banks, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, 
Yasuda and Dai-ichi, faced bank runs during the second wave of bank runs.7 And 
The Bank of Japan (1983) explains that the impact of closure of Jugo bank on 21 
April was also critical since the Ministry of the Imperial Household had the deposit 
account at Jugo Bank. 
As shown in Table 3, loans by the Bank of Japan increased remarkably during 
the period of the second panic. From 16 to 23 April, the percentage change of loans 
by the Bank of Japan is 106. The Minseito Party Cabinet resigned due to the 
responsibility for closure of the Bank of Taiwan, and the Seiyukai Party Cabinet 
was organized.8  
Takahashi Korekiyo, the new Finance Minister, imposed moratorium from 22 
April to 12 May to prevent the panic from expanding. Then the panic ended. The 
Ministry of Finance permitted closure of 30 ordinary banks during the panic period 
from 15 March to 25 April. On 8 May, the Bills on the Special Loans by the Bank of 
Japan passed the Diet. The bills have three main points: the special loans were 
provided with bill discount within a year; the Bank of Japan could demand 
compensation for losses from the government within 500 millions yen; and the 10 
year term of redemption. Takahashi and Morigaki (1993) argue that the interest 
rates of the special loans were too low to prevent supported banks from taking 
additional risks, and point out that the average of the interest rate was 3%. 
Discount rate in 1927 was 5.4% (Bank of Japan 1983). As Ishii (1999) explains, the 
Bank of Japan tended to provide the special loans for banks with transactions with 
the Bank of Japan during the first half of the twentieth century. However, the 
government ordinance allowed banks with no record of transactions with the Bank 
of Japan to be provided the special loans (Takahashi and Morigaki 1993). 
                                                  
6 The government sought the approval of the Privy Council to obtain an emergency imperial 
order to rescue the Bank of Taiwan. However, on 17 April, the Privy Council refused to sanction 
the order for the sake of resignation of the Cabinet. 
7 Ishii (2001) finds evidence that the headquarters of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and of 
Dai-ichi in Tokyo faced bank runs. 
8 Nakamura (1988) explains the relationship between political concerns and closure of the 
Bank of Taiwan. 
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Inoue Junnosuke, who belonged to the Minseito Party, was installed as the 
governor of the Bank of Japan on 10 May. He organized the screening committee for 
bank bailout since he had recognized that the special loans against the Great 
Earthquake of 1923 had caused some moral hazard issues.9 
The total amount of the special loans reached 762 millions yen. The Bank of 
Japan bailed out 103 ordinary banks, which included 14 closed ones. The total 
amount of the special loans provided for 14 closed banks reached 284 millions yen. 
The government established the Bank Relations and Supervision Department in 
the Bank of Japan to refuse the moral hazard problem.10 
 
2. Methodology and Data 
2.1 Estimation Methodology 
This paper uses the propensity scoring approach to test whether the Bank of 
Japan provided the special loans for insolvent banks against the panic of 1927. The 
analysis is conducted on two levels; the logit model regression and the tobit model 
regression. First, to estimate the propensity to close, this paper fits the following 
logit model:  
( ) [ ]jiii GdplsFundamentaXCLP ,1 φ==                              (1). 
Subscript i indicates the i-th bank and subscript j indicates the j-th prefecture. The 
dependent latent variable CLi equals 1 if the bank closed during the panic period 
from 15 March to 25 April, otherwise 0. The results of the logit model provide each 
predicted value of P(CLi =1|X)i. 
The explanatory variable Fundamentalsi indicates bank fundamentals. This 
paper uses three variables; capital ratio, ROE (return on equity), and scale. Capital 
ratio is (capital + accumulated fund) / (capital + accumulated fund + deposits). ROE 
is measured as profit by capital. And scale is log (capital + accumulated fund + 
deposits). The probit model regressions by Yabushita and Inoue (1993) show that 
these financial indices affected bank closure significantly. And Gdpj is per capita 
                                                  
9 Fukai Eigo, who was installed the governor of the Bank of Japan in 1935, reminisced this 
episode in his memoirs (Fukai 1941, pp.215-234). 
10 Some of the special loans against the panic of 1927 became the bad-loans of the Bank of Japan 
(Matsuzaki 1928). The Bank of Japan could not collect over 52 millions yen of them even in 1952 
(Ehiro 2000). 
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GDP of the j-th prefecture in which the main office of the bank was located. This 
variable is used to control local economic conditions. Results of the logit model 
regression provides the estimated propensity to close, P(CLi =1|X)i.11 
The second level of the analysis is to estimate the following tobit model: 
( )( )ijiijii GdpXCLPMinMsLLR εββββγα ++=+++= 4321 1,max     (2). 
Subscript i indicates the i-th bank and subscript j indicates the j-th prefecture. And 
εi is the error term. 
The censored variable LLRi, which is (the amount of the special loans for the 
i-th Bank) / (capital+fund), denotes financial support normalized by capital size.12 
Msi denotes the market share. This paper uses two variables as Msi ; Dsi, which is 
(deposits of the i-th bank) / (the total amount of deposits of banks in the j-th 
prefecture), and Lsi, which is (loans of the i-th bank) / (the total amount of loans of 
banks in the j-th prefecture). Minj, is the percentage of votes obtained by the 
Minseito Party in the Lower House election of 1928. As section 1 explained, Inoue 
Junnosuke, the governor of the Bank of Japan, belonged to the Minseito Party. This 
paper regards the variable Minj, as the proxy of the political power of the i-th bank 
in the j-th prefecture. P(CLi =1|X)i, which is the estimated propensity to close, 
denotes bank closure risk. And Gdpj is the variable to control local economic 
conditions as in the logit model (1). 
 
2.2 Data Availability 
The data for capital, deposits and profit are from “the 51st. Annual Report” of 
the Banking Department at the Ministry of Finance at the end of 1926. This paper 
uses log (per capita income tax of each prefecture) as the proxy of Gdpj, per capita 
GDP of each prefecture. The data source of per capita income tax is “the 47th. 
Statistical Yearbook” of the Cabinet Statistical Bureau. The data source of the 
percentage of votes is “the List of the 16th. Lower House election” by the Lower 
House Secretariat. The Bank of Japan (1969, pp.168–529) provides data on closed 
banks, which were permitted by the Ministry of Finance. The number of closed 
                                                  
11 This paper regresses the linear probability model or the probit model. Results are similar to 
reports in this paper. 
12 This paper also regresses the tobit models using the amount of the special loans as the 
censored variable. Results are similar to reports in this paper. 
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ordinary banks is 30. The Bank of Japan (1962) summarizes data for the special 
loans against the panic of 1927. The number of supported bank is 103. While “The 
51st. Annual Report” reveals financial data for 1402 ordinary banks, this paper 
excludes extraordinary observations; some were located in the exceptive region 
(Hokkaido Okinawa, Sakhalin and Taiwan); some had the extraordinary values of 
deposit (0 or nearly 0); and some closed or were merged before 15 March are 
excluded. This paper uses 1364 observations. 
Table 4 shows summary statistics for the explanatory variables; means, 
standard deviations, and minimum and maximum values. The minimum value of 
ROE (return on equity) is 0 since the data available from the Ministry of Finance 
archives are censored at zero. That is, even when a bank’s ROE (return on equity) 
was negative, the analysis has only the value 0. The minimum value of Ds, which is 
(deposits in thousands of yen of the i-th bank) / (the total amount of deposits of 
banks in the j-th prefecture), equals 0.000000483. And the minimum value of LLR, 
which is (the special loans for the i-th Bank) / (capital+fund), equals 0.  
 
3. Results 
3.1 Bank Closure Risk 
Table 5 reports results of the logit model regression on causes of bank closure 
during the panic period. The estimated coefficient of capital ratio is negative 
significant. This implies that closed banks may have been insolvent and that market 
discipline by uninsured depositors may have worked well during the panic period. The 
estimated coefficient of ROE (return on equity) is also negative significant. Solvency 
and profitability can explain bank closure well. The results here are consistent with 
the probit model regressions by Yabushita and Inoue (1993). 
The estimated coefficient of scale is positive significant. This implies that larger 
banks faced closure risk during the panic. The estimated coefficient of Per capita 
income tax is also positive significant. Teranishi (1999) points out that the panic of 
1927 may have damaged middle-sized and large-sized banks in the urban area. This 
explanation is consistent with the results here. 
Table 6 shows that summary statistics both for CL and for Propensity estimated 
by the logit model in Table 5; means, standard deviations, and minimum and 
maximum values. The mean value of the estimated propensity to close equals that of 
CL. The minimum value of estimated propensity to close is 0.00000000000007, exactly. 
The maximum value of the estimated propensity to close is 0.296. Since the 
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propensity scores are from the logit model, they are between 0 and 1. 
 
3.2 The LLR Assistance 
Table 7 reveals the results of the tobit model regressions. The equations in 
Panel A, B and C include the local deposit-market share Ds, the local loan-market 
share Ls, and both Ds and Ls, respectively. Ds is not a significant variable with 
robustness. On the other hand, the estimated coefficients of Ls are positive 
significant both in Panel B and in C (3.765 and 4.119, respectively). The estimated 
coefficients of Min are positive. And the estimated coefficients of Propensity are 
positive significant both in Panel B and in C (19.534 and 20.615, respectively). 
As shown in Table 8, this paper tests other tobits using the cross-terms: 
Ls*Propensity in Panel A and Min*Propensity in B, respectively. The cross-term 
Ls*Propensity is not significant. On the other hand, the estimated coefficient of 
Min*Propensity is negative significant. This implies that the effect of Min on the 
LLR assistance may have been substitute to that of Propensity. 
 
4. Discussion 
4.1 Implications 
Ehiro (2000) argues that the bailout policy against the panic of 1927 dealt with 
demands of small businesses that were damaged due to bank closure while it failed 
to rescue the depositors of closed banks. This argument is consistent with the 
results at this paper. The Bank of Japan concerned bank importance in the local 
loan-markets. The bailout policy against the panic of 1927 may have included the 
aspects of the industrial policy.13 
The Bank of Japan provided financial support for banks with higher closure 
risk or bailed out solvent banks if they were politically important for the Minseito 
Party even under the Seiyukai Party Cabinet. Takahashi and Morigaki (1993) 
argue that the LLR policy during the 1920s reflected the incentives of politicians. 
This paper cannot reject the argument. 
Okazaki (2006a) emphasizes that, during the interwar period, the Bank of 
Japan bailed out relatively solvent banks. The argument can be consistent with 
implications of the results at this paper. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) provides 
                                                  
13 Ishii (1999) emphasizes that the special loans by the Bank of Japan may have promoted not 
only the local economic growth but also income inequality among prefectures. 
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the theoretical framework on time-inconsistency of bank bailout policies: if the 
number of bank closure is large, the LLR bails out closed banks, whereas if the 
number of bank closure is small, closed banks are not rescued by the LLR but 
acquired by surviving banks. The bailout policy by the Bank of Japan may have 
included time-inconsistency framework. 
 
4.2 Shouwa Bank 
Inoue Junnosuke, the governor of the Bank of Japan, suggested the 
establishment of a new bank, Shouwa Bank, in order to reorganize some closed 
banks. The establishment of Shouwa bank may have been a model for the 
contemporary bridge banks. It was aimed to prevent sound corporations from losing 
financial support. The headquarters of 4 big banks, Mitusi, Mitsubishi, Yasuda and 
Dai-ichi, held meetings in July and decided to reorganize 6 closed banks into a new 
bank; Nakai, Nakazawa, Hachijushi, Murai, Kuki, and Oumi. 5 banks except Kuki 
were provided the special loans. The interest rate of the special loans for them was 
2% (the Bank of Japan 1969, p.367). It did not include penalty-premium since 
discount rate in 1927 was 5.4% (Bank of Japan 1983). Yamazaki (2000) explains 
that Shouwa bank became solvent during the 1930s. Bailing out these 6 banks 
succeeded in rescuing some sound corporations. The Bank of Japan dealt with 
demands of small businesses of these banks. 
Table 9 shows names of closed banks, the prefecture where the main office of 
the bank located, closure date and the estimated propensity score. Nakai, 
Nakazawa, Hachijushi, Murai, and Oumi had much higher closure risk while they 
were provided the special loans. Kuki, which was not provided, had lower closure 
risk. Some branches of Nakai Bank was located in Saitama prefecture. Kuki Bank 
may have been suffered form its contagion (the Bank of Japan 1969, p.409). The 
Bank of Japan provided financial support not for a sound bank, Kuki, but for 5 
unsound banks to organize Shouwa Bank, a bridge bank. 13.4% of the total special 
loans were provided for it. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper measures the “too big to fail” doctrine against the panic of 1927. 
Supported banks had higher closure risk but occupied key positions in the local 
loan-markets. And this paper finds that the Bank of Japan may have bailed out 
solvent banks if they had political importance for the Bank of Japan. 
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When the LLR target relatively insolvent banks, the costs of a system-wide 
bailout could be much more than that of a partial bailout. However, the Bank of 
Japan had the ways of reducing the costs. The establishment of a bridge bank may 
be one of them. And, as Ishii (1980) and Okazaki (2006a) explain, the Bank of Japan 
had the transaction relationships with much of supported banks. Okazaki (2006b) 
points out that such relationships may have provided information on supported 
insolvent banks. Exploring the costs of bank regulation after the panic may prove 
fruitful grounds for further studies. 
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Table 1 Gross Value Added of the Banking Sector
in Millions of Yen (1934-1936 prices): the 1920s
Real GVA of the
Banking Sector Real GNP
1921 486 12153
1922 416 11831
1923 457 11292
1924 433 11659
1925 390 12332
1926 372 12424
1927 348 12843
1928 345 13673
1929 348 13735
1930 232 13882
Source : Hijikata (1933), Ohkawa, et al. (1974)
year
 
Table 2 The Number of Ordinary Banks and the Average Size
year
The Average Size of Capital
of Ordinary Banks
(in Thousands of  Yen)
1922 1799 1315
1923 1701 1440
1924 1629 1499
1925 1537 1569
1926 1420 1680
1927 1283 1848
1928 1031 2118
1929 881 2467
1930 782 2602
1931 683 2859
Source : Goto (1970)
The Number of
Ordinary Banks
 
 
Table 3 Loans by the Bank of Japan during
the Panic Period ( in millions of yen)
03/12 228
03/19 301 27.8
03/26 528 56.2
04/09 525 -0.6
04/16 581 10.1
04/23 1677 106.0
04/30 1484 -12.2
Source : The Bank of Japan (1983;pp.173-179)
Percentage
ChangeDate
Loans by
the Bank of Japan
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Table 4 Summary Statistics
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Capital ratio 0.395 0.194 0.008 0.996
ROE (return on equity) 0.118 0.117 0.000 2.706
Scale 14.350 1.500 10.118 20.520
Per capita income tax 4.990 0.475 4.354 6.144
Ds 0.033 0.078 0.000 0.956
Min 0.420 0.086 0.222 0.728
LLR 0.059 0.407 0.000 7.194
The data set is comprised of 1364 ordinary banks in the end of 1926. Capital ratio
is (capital + accumulated fund) / (capital + accumulated fund + deposits) . ROE
(return on equity) is measured as profit by capital. Scale is log (capital +
accumulated fund + deposits). Per capita income tax is measured as the natural
log of per capita income tax of each prefecture where the main office was located.
Ds is (deposits of the i-th bank) / (the total amount of deposits of banks in the j-th
prefecture). Min  denotes the percentage of votes obtained by the Minseito Party in
the Lower House election of 1928. And LLR is (the amount of the special loans for
the i-th Bank) / (capital+fund).
 
Table 5 Results of the Logit Model Regression: Causes of Bank Closure
Capital ratio -2.701 0.968 0.005
ROE (return on equity) -10.553 3.314 0.001
Scale 0.249 0.082 0.002
Per capita income tax 0.939 0.330 0.004
Intercept -10.387 2.437 0.000
Log likelihood -126.0
Pseudo R-square 0.126
Observed P. 0.022
Observations at CL = 1 30
The data set is comprised of 1364 ordinary banks in the end of 1926. The results of the
logit model regression are shown; estimated coefficients, robust standard errors, and
significant levels (p-values). The dependent variable CL equals 1 if the bank closed
during the panic period from 15 March to 25 April, otherwise 0. Capital ratio is (capital
+ accumulated fund) / (capital + accumulated fund + deposits) . ROE (return on equity)
is measured as profit by capital. Scale is log (capital + accumulated fund + deposits).
And Per capita income tax is log (the per capita income tax of the j-th prefecture in
millions yen). Observed P. is the percent of total number of closed banks.
Estimated
coefficient
Robust
standard error
Significant
level
 
Table 6 Summary Statistics for the Estimated Propensity
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
CL 0.022 0.147 0.000 1.000
Propensity 0.022 0.031 0.000 0.296
CL equals 1 if the bank closed during the panic period from 15 March
to 25 April, otherwise 0. Propensity is the propensity score estimated
by the logit model regression in Table 5.
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Table 7 Results of the Tobit Model Regressions: the LLR Assistance
Ds 0.252 0.267 0.346
Min 2.487 1.179 0.035
Propensity 21.626 3.954 0.000
Per capita income tax -1.022 0.305 0.001
Intercept 0.433 1.473 0.769
Log likelihood -426.7
Pseudo R-square 0.067
Observations at LLR > 0 103
Ls 3.765 1.026 0.000
Min 2.289 1.168 0.050
Propensity 19.534 3.571 0.000
Per capita income tax -0.754 0.301 0.013
Intercept -0.891 1.485 0.548
Log likelihood -420.4
Pseudo R-square 0.081
Observations at LLR > 0 103
Ds -0.220 0.302 0.467
Ls 4.119 1.136 0.000
Min 2.234 1.169 0.056
Propensity 20.615 3.888 0.000
Per capita income tax -0.773 0.303 0.011
Intercept -0.792 1.491 0.595
Log likelihood -420.1
Pseudo R-square 0.081
Observations at LLR > 0 103
Estimated
coefficient Standard error
Significant
level
The data set is comprised of 1364 ordinary banks in the end of 1926. The results of the
tobit model regression are shown; estimated coefficients, standard errors, and significant
levels (p-values). The dependent variable LLR is (the amount of the special loans for the
i-th Bank) / (capital+fund). Ds is (deposits of the i-th bank) / (the total amount of deposits
of banks in the j-th prefecture). Min denotes the percentage of votes obtained by the
Minseito Party in the Lower House election of 1928. Propensity denotes the estimated
propensity score. Per capita income tax is log (the per capita income tax of the j-th
prefecture in millions yen). Ls is (loans of the i-th bank) / (the total amount of loans of
banks in the j-th prefecture)
Estimated
coefficient Standard error
Significant
level
Panel A: Using the Variable Ds
Panel B: Using the Variable Ls
Panel C: Using the Variables Ds and Ls
Estimated
coefficient Standard error
Significant
level
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Table 8 Results of the Tobit Model Regressions: Retests
Ls 5.648 1.752 0.001
Min 2.027 1.179 0.086
Propensity 22.323 4.196 0.000
Ls*Propensity -48.263 36.122 0.182
Per capita income tax -0.789 0.304 0.010
Intercept -0.677 1.495 0.651
Log likelihood -419.5
Pseudo R-square 0.083
Observations at LD > 1 103
Ls 2.935 1.065 0.006
Min 5.809 1.787 0.001
Propensity 100.062 30.281 0.001
Min*Propensity -173.793 64.294 0.007
Per capita income tax -0.736 0.298 0.014
Intercept -2.541 1.604 0.113
Log likelihood -416.6
Pseudo R-square 0.089
Observations at LD > 1 103
Panel B: Using the Cross-Term Min*Propensity
Estimated
coefficient Standard error
Significant
level
The data set is comprised of 1364 ordinary banks in the end of 1926. The results of the
logit model regression are shown; estimated coefficients, robust standard errors, and
significant levels (p-values). The dependent variable LLR is (the amount of the special
loans for the i-th Bank) / (capital+fund). Ds is (deposits of the i-th bank) / (the total
amount of deposits of banks in the j-th prefecture). Min denotes the percentage of votes
obtained by the Minseito Party in the Lower House election of 1928. Propensity denotes
the estimated propensity score. Per capita income tax is log (the per capita income tax
of the j-th prefecture in millions yen). Ls is (loans of the i-th bank) / (the total amount of
loans of banks in the j-th prefecture).
Panel A: Using the Cross-Term Ls*Propensity
Estimated
coefficient Standard error
Significant
level
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Table 9 The List of Closed Banks
Bank Name Prefecture Date Propensity Provided Shouwa Bank
Tokyo Watanabe Tokyo 03/15 0.080
Nakai Tokyo 03/19 0.189 Yes Yes
Yamashiro Kyoto 03/22 0.036
Nakazawa Tokyo 03/22 0.114 Yes Yes
Hachijushi Tokyo 03/22 0.146 Yes Yes
Murai Tokyo 03/22 0.212 Yes Yes
Souda Kanagawa 03/22 0.097 Yes
Kuki Saitama 03/22 0.007 Yes
Asanuma Gifu 03/23 0.039
Sousen Kyoto 03/23 0.018
Soeda Fukuoka 03/24 0.014
Toukatsu Chiba 03/31 0.020 Yes
Dai-Rokujugo Hyogo 04/08 0.063 Yes
Kurate Fukuoka 04/13 0.025 Yes
Kurita Shiga 04/15 0.023 Yes
Oumi Osaka 04/18 0.228 Yes Yes
Gamou Shiga 04/19 0.035
Sen'you Osaka 04/19 0.033
Ashina Hiroshima 04/19 0.022
Hiroshima Sangyo Hiroshima 04/20 0.007
Moji Fukuoka 04/20 0.008
Nishi Ehara Okayama 04/20 0.031 Yes
Takeda Waribiki Tokyo 04/21 0.039
Taishou Tokyo 04/21 0.090 Yes
Jugo Tokyo 04/21 0.246 Yes
Akashi Shoukou Hyogo 04/21 0.028
Shikano Yamaguchi 04/23 0.021
Kasen Osaka 04/25 0.068 Yes
Wakasa Fukui 04/25 0.010
Uozumi Hyogo 04/25 0.025
Table shows names of closed banks, the prefecture where the main office of the bank located,
closure date and the estimated propensity score. The values of Propensity score are estimated
by the logit model regression in Table 5. If the bank was provided the special loans by the Bank
of Japan, "Yes" is shown in the column "Provided." If the bank transferred its business to
Shouwa Bank, the bridge bank, "Yes" is shown in the column "Shouwa Bank."
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